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CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF MARITIME
NEUTRALITY
Maritime neutrality has recently come to the fore as one
of the engrossing problems of international law and relations
of -the present. The last years of the war marked a low point
in neutral rights, and, incidentally, a high point in the enforce-
ment of neutral duties. The general reaction to the world war
was that neutrality was a cowardly and unethical position to
maintain, and, instead of a demand for a restatement and exten-
sion of neutral rights, there was a wide-spread conviction that
neutrality as a policy or status ought no longer to be tolerated.
It was believed in many quarters that war could no longer be
localized anyway, and that, therefore, the cause of peace would
be better served by setting up procedural machinery for the
settlement of international disputes, followed by joint action
against an "aggressor" state. These ideas and principles found
expression in the Covenant and organization of the League of
Nations.
But it must not be thought that adherents to the older sys-
tem of neutrality had entirely disappeared. In fact, the pen-
dulum at the present moment seems to be swinging somewhat
in the direction of the older conception. The most pronounced
statement of this conception is found in the projected codifica-
tion of international law being carried on under the auspices
of the Pan American Conferences.
The history of this proposed codification is briefly as fol-
lows: The Fifth Pan American Conference, which met at San-
tiago de Chile in 1923, unanimously adopted a resolution for
the creation of an International Commission of Jurists for the
purpose of codifying public and private international law. The
Governing Board of the Pan American Union, under the in-
fluence of Charles Evans Hughes, then United States Secretary
of State and Chairman of the Board, invited the American In-
stitute of International Law to prepare a series of projects for
the consideration of the International Commission of Jurists.
The Institute drew up a series of thirty projects, which on
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March 2, 1925, were presented to the Governing Board qf the
Pan American ,Union.1
The International Commission of Jurists took up its work in
Rio de Janeiro 'in April and May, 1927. Twelve projects and a
code of private international law were approved by the Institute
and referred for further action to the Sixth Pan American Con-
ference held at Havana, Cubp, January and February of this
year. One of the .projects, No. IX, deals with Maritime Neu-
trality, while still another, No. XI, deals with the obligation of
States in case of civil war.2
Quite in contrast with the League of Nations Covenant, the
trend of which is in the direction of a considerably limited right
of neutrality, the project of the International Commfission of
Jurists imposes a duty of remaining neutral Article I of the
project is as follows:
"In case of war between two or 'more States the other States shall
consider it'a duty to remain neutral and to contribute by the offer of
their good offices' and mediation to'putting an end to the conflict,
"The fulfillment of this duty shall not in any case be considered
by the belligerents as an unfriendly act."
The emphasis of this article on this "new conception of
neutrality," as, it is called in the preamble to the project of the
American Institute of International Law, is. even more pro-
nounced than in the 9rginal article in the project of the Insti-
tute, for the word used in the second clause is changed from
"right" fo "duty."
By contrast, the right of neutrality'of a member of the
League of Nations is limited by articles 10, '11 and 16 of the
Covenant. Article 10 imposes the obligation "to respect and
'See article by James Brown Scott, "The Gradual and Progressive
Codification of International Law", in the American Journal of Inter-
naational Law, July, 1927, Vol. 21, 417 ff. The texts of these projects
the founa in Codification-of International Law-Projects of Conven-
tions, prepared at the request on' January 2, 1924, of the Governing
Board of -the Pan American Union for the consideration of the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists and submitted by the American Insti-
tute of International Law to the Governing Board of the Pan American
Union, March 2, 1925 (Pan American Union, 1925); also in -Special
Supplement to the American Journal of International Law, Oct., 1926;
Vol. 20; 279-387.
2 The texts of these projects are f6und in the Special Supplement
to the American Journal of International Law, January, 1928; Vol. 22,
No. 1.
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preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity
and existing political independence of all members of the
League." Clearly, no member of the League may remain neu-
tral in case the territory of another member of the League is
being violated. Article 11 states that "any war or threat of
war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the
League or not, is hereby declared a -matter of concern to the
whole League, and the League shall take any action that may
be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations."
This article opens a large number of cases in which, subject to
the decision of the League, a member State loses its individual
right of remaining neutral.
A far more sweeping renunciation of the right of neutrality
is found in Article 16. Under Article 12 the members of the
League agree to submit their disputes either to arbitration or to
inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to
war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or
the report -by the Council. Any State resorting to war in vio-
lation -of this agreement shall "ipso facto be deemed to have
committed an act of war against all other members of the
League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the
severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of
all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the
covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial,
commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the
covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State,
whether a member of the League or not." Furthermore, it be-
comes the duty of the Council in such eases to recommend to the
several members concerned what effective military, naval, or air
force they shall severally contribute for the enforcement of the
provisions of these articles.
No comment is needed to point out the utterly divergent,
even conflicting, conceptions of neutrality under the League of
Nations and the Pan American project. It would not seem pos-
sible that the same State could be loyal to both conceptions, and
since many of the Latin American States are members of the
League, the ratification by them of the International Commis-
sion of Jurists project would seem a violation of Article 20 of
the Covenant, under which the members of the League "sol-
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emnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any
agreement inconsistent with the terms thereof."
The second clause of Article 1, stating that the fulfillment
of the duty of good offices and mediation shall not in any case
be considered by the belligerents as an unfriendly act, is cer-
tainly not a new conception. in fact, the tendering of good of-
fices and mediation may be said to bear a semi-legal character.3
Under the terms qf the First Hague Convention a State has not
only always the right, but prior to hostilities, even a semi-obli-
gation to offer good offices and meditation.4
This emphasis upon the rights of neutrals, regardless of
how unjust the origin of the war may have been on the part of
the belligerents, is reflected in Article 2 of the Project on Mar-
itime Neutrality.
With a view to insuring "respect for the rights of neu-
trals, and particularly the freedom of commerce and naviga-
tion," the Governing Board of the Pan American Union is re-
quired to meet immediately upon the declaration of war "to
ascertain the common interests of the States and to suggest to
them fitting measures." Thus, while the League of Nations is
in this respect primarily an agency for the maintenance of
peace, the Pan American Union under this provision would be-
come primarily an agency for the maintenance of neutral rights.5
The anomalous position of those Latin American States which
are members both of the Pan American Union and the League of
Nations is most apparent under the provisions of this article.
As a member of the League, these States may be called upon to
3Fenwick, International Law, p. 402;. Hershey, Revised Edition,
p. 460.4 Art. 2. "In case of serious disagreement or dispute, before an
appeal to arms, the Contracting Powers agree to have recourse, as far
as the circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or
more friendly powers."
Art. 3. Independently of this course, the Contracting Powers
deem it expedient and desirable, that one or more Powers, strangers to
the dispute, should, on their own Initiative and as far as circumstances
may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the States at vari-
ance."
"Powsrs, strangers tn the dispute, have the right to offer good offices
or mediation, even during the course of hostilities."
"The exercise of this right can never be regarded by either of the
parties at variance as an unfriendly act."
'See editorial on the project of the American Institute of Inter-
national Law by Quincy Wright in the American Journal of Inter-
national Law, January, 1927, Vol. 21, pp. 127 ff.
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forego neutral rights and cooperate in an international boycott
against an aggressive State, while as members of the Pan Amer-
ican Union these States may be asked to engage in a cooperative
action to insure respect for neutral rights. There has been a
considerable opinion in this country, that the United States gov-
ernment, even though not a member of the League, ought not to
insist upon the customary neutral rights of its nationals to
irade with a .belligerent, if that belligerent has been declared
an "aggressor" State, and is being subjected to a League boy-
cott. This opinion has found expression in a joint resolution
introduced in the lower house of Congress by Representative
Theodore E. Burton of Ohio.
The Burton resolution would declare it to be "the policy
of the United States to prohibit the exportation of arms, muni-
tions or implements of war to any country which engages in
aggressive warfare against any other country in violation of a
treaty, convention or agreement to resort to arbitration or other
peaceful means for the settlement of international controver-
sies." The effect of this resolution would be to place the United
States, even though. not a member of the League, on the side of
the League in punishing an aggressive State.
There seems also to be a conflict of principle between
Articles 1 and 2 of the Pan American project. How far does
the duty to remain neutral extend? If it extends so far as to
prohibit any use of force in the enforcement of neutral rights,
assuming that there is a continued violation of these rights after
repeated protests from the Governing Board of the Pan Ameri-
can Union, the duty to remain neutral will certainly destroy all
effectiveness of the protests against the violation of neutral
rights.
A current movement, constantly gaining in strength, which
throws still more uncertainty about the future development of
the law of neutrality, is the movement to outlaw war. This
movement which had its origin and has its greatest following
in this country,6 came to a dramatic issue in April, 1927, when
OAs early as February 14, 1923, Senator Win. E. Borah, a leading
advocate of the outlawry of war, introduced the following resolution
in the Senate, and has reintroduced it in every succeeding Congress,
"that war between nations should be outlawed as an institution or
means for the settlement of international controversies by making it
a public crime under the law of nations . . .. that a code of in-
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M. Briand, Foreign Minister of France, proposed in a public
address to subscribe to an engagement with the United States
to outlaw war. This proposal was officially made through dip-
lomatic channels on July 1. On December 28, Mr. Kellogg, the
American Secretary of State, proposed in reply to the Briand
proposal, that the agreement be made multi-lateral instead of
bi-lateral, and that it outlaw all war, and. not only aggressive
war. At the present moment, Franco-Americah negotiations
seemed to have reached a deadlock. France insists that it-can-
not subscribe to an engagement to outlaw all war without vio-
lating her commitments and obligations under the League of
Nations and the Locarno Pact, for under these France has ob-
ligations to wage war against a state which disturbs the peace.
In Europe generally, and also in certain quarters in the United
States, the Kellogg counter proposal is regarded as a proposal
to renounce the Covenant of the League of Natiolas, or, as put
by Senator Borah, "a system which is an alliance to go to war
comes in conflict with a system not to go to war.' '7
For the purposes of this article it is important to know
only what, under the system of the outlawry of wars, happens
to the concept of neutrality. Contrary to what one would at
first blush expect, the probleba of neutrality does not entirely dis-
appear from this system, but makes its re-appearance under a
different form. Defensive war, thrown out at the front door,
comes in again at the back door as self-defense. And if self-
defensive is permitted, third States will still have to determine
what their position will be when an outbreak occurs. Will third
States have a right to remain neutral, a duty to remain neutral,
or will they have a duty to go to the aid of the defensive State?
That the plan to outlaw war would not take away the right
of self-defense is apparent from the statements of its various
ternational law be created and adopted ........ and that a judicial
substitute for war should be created (or if existing in part, adapted
and adjusted) in the form of an international court, modeled on our
Federal Supreme Court", etc. For full text see dongressional Digest,
March, 1928, p. 77.
'New York Times, February 5, 1928. See also Foreign Policy As-
sociation report on The League of Nations and Outlawry of War, Feb-
ruary 17, 1928.
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advocates.8 In a recent and very important article, in which
he- attempts to reconcile the League system and the system to
outlaw war proposed by Secretary Kellogg, Senator Borah
makes this very clear.
"As to France's other compacts or alliances, these are all
supposed to be in harmony with the principles and provisions of
the Covenant and to be filed with the League. Let us assume,
for example, in the case of Belgium, which has been raised by
the French, that France is absolutely obligated under her al-
liance to come to the relief of Belgium in case of attack. This
commitment can be easily protected.
"All that is necessary is for the multi-lateral pact to be
signed by Belgium, in which event all the signatories agree not
to use war or force in any dispute or matter relating to Belgium'
If an attack, nevertheless, is made on Belgium by one bf the
signatories it would constitute a breach of the multilateral
treaty and would thereby ipso facto release France and enable
her to fulfill her military engagements with Belgium. In other
-words, France's commitment to Belgium would merely be in
suspense so long as the signatories kept their multilateral com-
pact, there would be no violation thereof." 9
Thus, if Senator Borah states the case correctly, the pro-
blem of neutrality, at least for non-members of the League re-
-mains much the same as before. If two or more States go to
war'in spite of their treaty obligations such countries will still
have to decide on a line of conduct. It may insist upon the an-
-ient rights of neutrals, which may, of course, be a great aid to
the outlaw State; or it may adopt the policy outlined in the
Burton resolution and prohibit the export of arms and muni-
tions, and possibly all supplies as well; or it may join with other
powers to put down the outlaw.
Codification of international law has also been undertaken
'by the League of Nations. Codification was recommended by
the Commission of Jurists which drew up the Statute of the
World C6urt and a Committee was appointed by the Council in
s See S. 0. Levinson in the Yale Daily News, April 21, 1925; and Mr.
Levinson's letter to Mr. J. C. Garnett, of March 11, 1924, issued in
pamphlet form by the American Committee for -the Outlawry of War,
and see John Dewey's articles in the New Republic, October 3 and 24,
1923.
' New York Times, February 5, 1928.
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1924. This Committee was instructed "to prepare a provisional
list of the subjects of international law the regulation of which
by international agreement would seem to be most desirable and
realizable at the present moment," to refer this list to the gov-
ernments of the world, to examine their replies, and then "to re-
port to the Council on the questions which are sufficiently ripe."
All questions dealing with neutrality were deferred, on the
ground evidently, that international agreement on them was
not yet realizable. 10
And now along comes Mr. Bgrah with the introduction in
the Senate of a joint resolution for calling an international con-
ference to codify maritime neutrality laws before the Naval
Limitation Conference convenes in 1931.11 The feeling behind
the resolution seems to be that no further progress in the
movement for the limitation of naval armament can be made
until the rights of neutrals at sea has been clearly defined.
Should such a conference be called the whole problem of
the League of Nations sanctions, such as blockade and economic
boycott, would undoubtedly be raised. Will the non-members
of the League insist upon the former neutral rights at sea, even
if the belligerent is one of a concert of powers acting against
an aggressor under the proyisions of the League of Nations.
Should the United States insist upon that the sanctions of the
League will almost certainly prove unworkable. The two sys-
tems are incompatible. The old system of neutrality is based
upon the principle that wars are of concern only to the parties
to it, and that wars can be localized. This conception is based
upon conditions and an age to which the world war marks an
end. The League conception is based upon the idea that a war
anywhere in the world concerns the rest of the world, and that
a war once started, is bound sooner or later to become general.
Finally, in returning briefly to the project of maritime
neutrality drawn up. by the Commission of Jurists, it may be
noted, that its provisions, with minor modifications, appears to
have been accepted by the Pan American Conference at
10See Special -Supplement -to the American Journal of International
Law, January, 1928, for the report of this Committee. See article by
Jesse S. Reeves, Progress of the Work of -the League of Nations Codifi-
cation Committee, in American Journal of International Law, October,
1927.
"New York Times, February 25, 1928.
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Havana. However, the United States delegation entered a
reservation to Article 3, which with a few verbal changes in the
text, reproduces Article I of the Washington Convention on
Submarines and Poison Gases. The article is designed to pre-
vent the destruction of merchant vessels without warning and
without placing the crew and passengers in safety. When this
article came before the committee at the Pan American Confer-
ence the Argentine delegate moved to include armed merchant
ships in the class of warships, thus removing them from the pro-
tection of this article. The United States, Uraguay, Panama
and Cuba, declared themselves against such classification, but the
committee voted to assimilate armed merchant ships to war ships
by a vote of eleven to four.12
This same question of the classification of armed merchant-
men came up in the very same way at the Washington Confer-
ence. There the Italian delegation, with the apparent endorse-
ment of the French delegation, would accept the resolutions
which were finally embodied in the submarine convention only
on the understanding that the term ".merchant vessel" in the
resolution referred solely to unarmed merchantmen. 13
The problem of the classification of armed merchantmen
came up during the World War in connection with the treat-
ment which should be accorded them in American ports. The
policy of the United States in this matter was not entirely con-
sistent. The United States recognized the right of belligerent
merchantmen to resist capture, and at first made the admission
of belligerent armed merchantmen into its ports dependent upon
the defensive character of the weapons, such character to be de-
termined in each case by the port officials. As evidence of
the defensive character of the arms the following were to be
taken into consideration; the number, caliber, character, size,
and position of the guns; the quantity of ammunition carried,
whether the vessel was manned by its usual crew and officers;
whether the vessel intended t9 clear for a port lying in its usual
trade route; whether the vessel took on board food and supplies
sufficient to carry it to its port of destination; whether the cargo
"New York Times, February 15, 1928.
"Proceedings, Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, 1922, pp. 688 and 692.
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of the vessel consisted of commerce unsuited for the use of a
ship of war in operation against an enemy, etc.14
The rules laid down in this circular were superseded by
new rules embodied in a memorandum of March 25, 1916. The
memorandum declared that the status of a belligerent armed
merchantman was to be considered from two points of view,
from that of a neutral when the vessel enters its ports, and from
that of an enemy when the vessel is on the high seas. The status
of a belligerent armed merchantman in a neutral port was to
be determined from the presence on board of a "Commission of
War." Unless there was such a commission the presumption
was that the vessel was armed for defense.15
That the American State Department was not entirely cer-
tain of-the correctness of it classification is indicated by a con-
fidential letter of January 18, 1916, sent to all the belligerent
governments. In this letter Mr. Lansing expressed the hope
that a formula might be found by which submarine warfare
could be brought within "the rules of international law and
the principles of humanity without destroying its efficiency in
the destruction of commerce." He pointed to the changed con-
ditions of naval warfare brought about by the advent of the
submarine. A merchant vessel carrying a small calibre gun is
effective in an attack on a submarine, and since pirates are no
longer found on the high seas and privateering has been abol-
ished, the arming of merchantmen can now only be explained
on the ground of a purpose to render merchantmen superior in
force to submarines and to prevent warning and visit and search
by them. "Any armament, therefore, on a merchant vessel,
seemd to have the character of an offensive armament. '
The nature of the formula which Mr. Lansing hoped would
be acceptable to both belligerents can be gathered from the fol-
lowing paragraph of this letter:
"It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocallyjust arrangement if it could -be agreed by the opposing belligerents that
submarines should be caused to adhere stritly to -the rules of inter-
national law in the matter of stopping and searching merchant vessels,
determining their belligerent nationality, and removing the crews and
' "Circular of September 19, 1914. Text in American Journal Inter-
national Law, Special Supplement, Vol. IX, 121, and also in Naval War
College, International Law Topics, 1916, 93-95.1 Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1916, 101 ff.
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passengers to places of safety before sinking the vessels as prizes of
war, and that merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be
prohibited and prevented from carrying any armament whatsoever.",
The Netherlands government during the World War assimi-
lated armed merchantmen tu warships and excluded them both
from her ports and waters.'7 From all this it would appear
that there is yet no great amount of agreement on the regulation
of the use of submarines, nor the status of armed merchantmen.
It cannot be said that the project of the International Com-
mission of Jurists represents any great advance in the codifica-
tion of the law of neutrality. The project is hardly more than
a restatement of the XIII Hague Convention, with a few addi-
tions, such as the articles discussed. Afore radical departures,
attempting to solve some of the more difficult problems raised
by the experiences of the World War, were found only in the
form of voeuz attached to the projects recommended by the
American Institute of International Law, but these were dropped
by the International Commission of Jurists. These voeux., four
in number, dealt with the exclusion of warships from neutral
ports and territorial waters, except in case of force majeure,
the prohibition of a commercial blockade, the inviolability of
merchant ships at sea, and the abolition of the right of search.
Any attempt now to restate the law of belligerent and neu-
tral rights at sea will open large questions of the whole system
or structure of international society. It will undoubtedly
cause, both here and abroad, but especially here, a fresh exam-
ination of the fundamental principles on which international
society shall be based. The older system, with its sharp differ-
entiation between neutrals and belligerents proved quite unsuc-
cessful during the last war. Nor is the United States in a very
good position to stand strictly on the rights of neutrals as they
stood before 1914, for when the United States entered the war,
it went very nearly as far as did any of the-belligerents in ignor-
ing neutral rights, even to the extent of ignoring its o~vn pro-
tests on the subject made only a few months before as a neu-
tral. Moreover, this system of neutrality is utterly divorced
"
6American Journal of International Law, Special Supplement, X,
312.
2, Vandenbosch, Neutrality of the Netherlands During the World
War, Ch. VIIL
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from justice. It may mean aiding the aggressive party in the
dispute. The way of the Burton resolution would remove that
awkward possibility. Under it the United States would, at least
to a certain extent, accept the no small burden involved in -pre-
venting the export of arms and munitions to an aggressive bel-
ligerent, but the United States would still be absent from the
machinery and organzation which would in many cases have
to determine who was the aggressor. Under this system the
United States would take the results of a system, while refusing
to take part in reaching that result. The only other alternative
is a full participation in all the machinery of the League of Na-
tions.
A. VAwDENBOSQE.
University of Kentucky.
